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| Paragraph 1 |
It is clear also from these very facts what consequence confronts
those who say the Ideas are substances capable of separate existence,
and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and the differentiae. |
| Paragraph 2 |
Now (1) if the 'animal' in 'the horse' and in 'man' is one and the
same, as you are with yourself, (a) how will the one in things that
exist apart be one, and how will this 'animal' escape being divided
even from itself? |
| Paragraph 3 |
Further, (b) if it is to share in 'two-footed' and 'many-footed',
an impossible conclusion follows; |
| Paragraph 4 |
But (2) suppose the Form to be different in each species. |
| Paragraph 5 |
Further, (3)in the case of sensible things both these consequences
and others still more absurd follow. |
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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26