Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 7 Part 11 - Formulae, parts, substance and essence

Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 7 Part 11

Formulae, parts, substance and essence

Paragraph 1 Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the concrete thing.

Paragraph 2 Since this is thought to be possible, but it is not clear when it is the case, some people already raise the question even in the case of the circle and the triangle, thinking that it is not right to define these by reference to lines and to the continuous, but that all these are to the circle or the triangle as flesh and bones are to man, and bronze or stone to the statue;

Paragraph 3 It follows then that there is one Form for many things whose form is evidently different (a conclusion which confronted the Pythagoreans also);

Paragraph 4 We have pointed out, then, that the question of definitions contains some difficulty, and why this is so.

Paragraph 5 Regarding the objects of mathematics, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the wholes;

Paragraph 6 It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally;

Paragraph 7 Whether there is, apart from the matter of such substances, another kind of matter, and one should look for some substance other than these, e.g. numbers or something of the sort, must be considered later.

Paragraph 8 What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has been stated universally in a way which is true of every case, and also why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not.

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Paragraph 1	Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the concrete thing.
Paragraph 2	Since this is thought to be possible, but it is not clear when it is the case, some people already raise the question even in the case of the circle and the triangle, thinking that it is not right to define these by reference to lines and to the continuous, but that all these are to the circle or the triangle as flesh and bones are to man, and bronze or stone to the statue;
Paragraph 3	It follows then that there is one Form for many things whose form is evidently different (a conclusion which confronted the Pythagoreans also);
Paragraph 4	We have pointed out, then, that the question of definitions contains some difficulty, and why this is so.
Paragraph 5	Regarding the objects of mathematics, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the wholes;
Paragraph 6	It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally;
Paragraph 7	Whether there is, apart from the matter of such substances, another kind of matter, and one should look for some substance other than these, e.g. numbers or something of the sort, must be considered later.
Paragraph 8	What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has been stated universally in a way which is true of every case, and also why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not.