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| Paragraph 1 |
We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or
different. |
| Paragraph 2 |
Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be generally
thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different
from the essence of white man. |
| Paragraph 3 |
But in the case of so-called self-subsistent things, is a thing necessarily
the same as its essence? |
| Paragraph 4 |
Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in
no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments
and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence,
so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that
both must be one. |
| Paragraph 5 |
(But of an accidental term, e.g.'the musical' or 'the white', since
it has two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is identical
with its essence; |
| Paragraph 6 |
The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to
assign a name to each of the essences; |
| Paragraph 7 |
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and
the same as its essence. |
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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26