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From the same opinion proceeds the doctrine of Protagoras, and both
doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. |
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Evidently, then, both doctrines proceed from the same way of thinking. |
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Those who really feel the difficulties have been led to this opinion
by observation of the sensible world. |
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And (2) similarly some have inferred from observation of the sensible
world the truth of appearances. |
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And again, they say that many of the other animals receive impressions
contrary to ours; |
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And in general it is because these thinkers suppose knowledge to
be sensation, and this to be a physical alteration, that they say
that what appears to our senses must be true; |
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"For wisdom increases in men according to what is before them." |
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And elsewhere he says that: |
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"So far as their nature changed, so far to them always
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Came changed thoughts into mind. |
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And Parmenides also expresses himself in the same way: |
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"For as at each time the much-bent limbs are composed,
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So is the mind of men; |
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'Tis one thing thinks - the substance of their limbs: |
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For that of which there is more is thought. |
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A saying of Anaxagoras to some of his friends is also related, - that
things would be for them such as they supposed them to be. |
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But the reason why these thinkers held this opinion is that while
they were inquiring into the truth of that which is, they thought,
'that which is' was identical with the sensible world; |
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But we shall say in answer to this argument also that while there
is some justification for their thinking that the changing, when it
is changing, does not exist, yet it is after all disputable; |
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Regarding the nature of truth, we must maintain that not everything
which appears is true; |
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And, in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing
if animate things were not; |