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| Paragraph 1 |
Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and
one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary
that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. |
| Paragraph 2 |
But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting
on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily
be movement; |
| Paragraph 3 |
Yet there is a difficulty; |
| Paragraph 4 |
Yet if we follow the theologians who generate the world from night,
or the natural philosophers who say that 'all things were together',
the same impossible result ensues. |
| Paragraph 5 |
This is why some suppose eternal actuality - e.g. Leucippus and Plato; |
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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26